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Abstract
This study examines the expectational stability of the rational expectations equi-
libria (REE) under alternative Taylor rules when trend inﬂation is non-zero. We ﬁnd
that when trend inﬂation is high, the REE is likely to be expectationally unstable.
This result holds true regardless of the nature of the data (such as contemporaneous
data, forecast, and lagged data) introduced in the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that
a high macroeconomic volatility during the period of high trend inﬂation can be well
explained by introducing the concept of expectational stability.
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1 Introduction
Many of the monetary policy analyses based on the New Keynesian framework have ne-
glected the existence of non-zero trend inﬂation. However, several recent studies point out
that the introduction of non-zero trend inﬂation has profound implications for monetary
policy. Among them, Kiley (2007) and Ascari and Ropele (2009) introduce alternative
versions of Taylor rules into New Keynesian models with non-zero trend inﬂation. They
show that the so-called Taylor principle, which requires the central bank to adjust the
nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with the variations of the inﬂation rate, does
not necessarily guarantee the determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium (REE)
when the level of trend inﬂation is positive. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) recently
argue that high trend inﬂation in the 1970s made the U.S. economy indeterminate even
though the Fed’s policy likely satisﬁed the Taylor principle during that period. This implies
that the central bank should carefully choose its policy rule coeﬃcients by recognizing the
relationship between the level of trend inﬂation and the determinacy of REE.
However, these studies assume that the economic agents have perfect knowledge of
macroeconomic structures and always form rational expectations. If we instead assume
that the agents only have imperfect knowledge and are learning about the structure of
the economy over time, then the determinacy of REE is not the sole requirement for the
central bank. Bullard and Mitra (2002) propose the expectational stability (E-stability) of
REE, which ensures convergence of expectations to the REE under the standard learning
algorithm, as another requirement for monetary policy rules. They show the parameter
regions that satisfy the E-stability conditions as well as the determinacy conditions under
alternative versions of Taylor rules. Their main ﬁnding is that the relationship between
determinacy and E-stability depends on the version of policy rule being used. However,
their study focuses on a relatively speciﬁc environment in which trend inﬂation is exactly
equal to zero. It is still unclear how the introduction of non-zero trend inﬂation will aﬀect
their results.
In this study, we attempt to obtain the E-stability (as well as determinacy) conditions of
REE, taking into account the presence of non-zero trend inﬂation. Several previous studies
show that the introduction of non-zero trend inﬂation makes ﬁrms’ pricing behavior more
forward-looking compared to the case of zero trend inﬂation.1 As a result, the rate of
current inﬂation is inevitably aﬀected by long-horizon inﬂation forecasts. This is the only,
but important, departure from the study of Bullard and Mitra (2002).
Our analysis ﬁnds that when the level of trend inﬂation is high, the REE is likely
to be E-unstable. This result holds true regardless of the nature of the data (such as
contemporaneous data, forecast, and lagged data) used in the Taylor rule. We also show
1See, for example, Ascari (2004), Ascari and Ropele (2007), Sbordone (2007) and Cogley and Sbordone
(2008).
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that while the availability of current economic data in the conduct of monetary policy is
a key to E-stability as well as REE determinacy in a low inﬂation environment, this is not
necesarily the case in a high inﬂation environment.
Our results on E-stability conditions appear to be parallel with Ascari and Ropele’s
(2009) ﬁnding on determinacy conditions. However, there is an important diﬀerence be-
tween the two cases. Ascari and Ropele (2009) show that in the case of the lagged-data
rule, a rise in trend inﬂation does not necessarily narrow the determinacy region because
the central bank can easily attain determinacy by responding strongly to the lagged out-
put gap. In contrast, our study ﬁnds that higher trend inﬂation under the lagged rule
makes the REE more likely to be E-unstable even if it is determinate. This means that
high trend inﬂation is more robustly undesirable in terms of E-stability than determinacy.
Therefore, the introduction of a learning mechanism can provide a better explanation for
the well-established positive relationship between high trend inﬂation and macroeconomic
instability.
2 The model
2.1 A New Keynesian model under non-zero trend inflation
Some previous studies, such as Kiley (2007), Sbordone (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008)
and Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009), provide alternative expressions of New Keynesian
models under non-zero trend inﬂation. Our model is based on that of Sbordone (2007) and
of Cogley and Sbordone (2008), which is given as follows:
yt = yet+1 − σ(it − πet+1 − rnt ), (1)
πt = κyt + b1πet+1 + b2
∞∑
j=2
φj−11 π
e
t+j , (2)
rnt = ρrr
n
t−1 + εt. (3)
πt is the percentage deviation of inﬂation from the (possibly non-zero) rate of trend in-
ﬂation, which is assumed to be constant. yt, it and rnt are the output gap, the nominal
interest rate and the natural rate of real interest, respectively.2 For an arbitrary variable
x, xe denotes the expectations of variable x. The original AS equation used by Cogley and
Sbordone (2008, eq.8) also includes two additional terms: one is the term that depends
on long-horizon forecasts of the output gap, and the other on past inﬂation. We employ a
2Preston (2005, 2006) argues that if adaptive learning is introduced for the process of agents’ expectation
formations, structural equations determining the output gap and inﬂation rate should involve long-horizon
forecasts even when trend inﬂation does not exist. However, Honkapohja (2003) and Honkapohja, Mitra
and Evans (2002) point out that bounded rationality itself does not call for long-horizon forecasts. They
insist that the structural equations with one-period-ahead forecasts are still valid as long as agents have
identical subjective expectations.
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simpler AS equation because Cogley and Sbordone (2008) show that the estimated coef-
ﬁcients on the additional terms are virtually zero.3 Given the irrelevancy of those terms,
our model is essentially the same as the one used by Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009).
Since ﬁrms take into account the inﬂuence of trend inﬂation on their future relative
prices, they are more forward-looking under non-zero trend inﬂation than under zero trend
inﬂation. As a result, long-horizon forecasts emerge in the third term of (2), and thus the
parameters κ, b1, b2 and φ1 are aﬀected by the level of trend inﬂation.4 In this respect our
framework is distinct from the standard one used in the benchmark work by Bullard and
Mitra (2002).
To see how non-zero trend inﬂation inﬂuences ﬁrms’ forward-lookingness, it would be
useful to check the values of b1 and b2 under alternative levels of trend inﬂation. Under
our parameterization, (b1, b2) takes the values of (.968,−.009), (.99,0) and (1.033, .017)
for the rate of (annualized) trend inﬂation -1%, 0%, 2%, respectively.5 Thus, the sum of
coeﬃcients on inﬂation expectations increases with the level of trend inﬂation. We also
ﬁnd that b2 > 0 for positive trend inﬂation and b2 < 0 for negative trend inﬂation. This
implies that the “additional forward-lookingness” stemming from the presence of non-zero
trend inﬂation works in the opposite direction depending on whether the trend inﬂation is
positive or negative.
As for monetary policy rules, we introduce some versions of Taylor rules in which the
central bank responds to (i) the contemporaneous data (yt, πt), (ii) the forecast (yet+1,
πet+1), and (iii) the lagged data (yt−1, πt−1). The policy rule is generally given as
it = FlXt−1 + FcXt + FfXet+1 (4)
where Xt = [yt πt]′, Fi = [Fiy Fiπ] for i = c, f, l. c, f and l represent the contemporaneous
rule, the forecast-based rule, and the lagged-based rule, respectively.
2.2 Adaptive learning
We assume that agents estimate their perceived law of motions (PLM) by recursive least
squares with decreasing gain, which is the most standard algorithm of adaptive learning
3Cogley and Sbordone (2008) report that the degree of price indexation is statistically not diﬀerent from
zero, and the estimated coeﬃcient on the long-horizon forecasts of the output gap is at most 5× 10−3 over
the whole sample period (1960Q1:2003Q4).
4Cogley and Sbordone (2008) derive the parameters as follows: φ1 = αβΠ
(θ−1)
, φ2 = αβΠ
θ(1+ω)
,
χ = 1−αΠ
(θ−1)
α(1+θω)Π
(θ−1) , b1 = (1 + (1 + ω)θχ)φ2 − (θ − 1)χφ1, b2 = (θ − 1)χ(φ2 − φ1), κ = χ(1− φ2), where α
is the probability of not changing prices, β is the discount factor, θ is the elasticity of substitution among
diﬀerent goods, ω is the responsiveness of real marginal cost to output, and Π is the trend inﬂation in gross
term. The parameter values used in our numerical exercises follow those of Cogley and Sbordone (2008):
α = .588, θ = 9.8 and ω = .429. β and σ are set at .99 and 6.25, respectively.
5In examining the relationship between the E-stability and level of trend inﬂation, we pay attention not
only to positive trend inﬂation, but also to negative trend inﬂation because deﬂation has become a more
pressing concern in the major developed countries.
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(Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). In order to simplify the expression, some previous studies
modify the AS equation (2) with an auxiliary variable, which is a linear combination of
current output, one-period-ahead inﬂation forecast and the expectation of the next period’s
auxiliary variable.6 This treatment is valid under the rational expectations hypothesis,
where the economic agents know the functional forms and parameters of the structural
equations. However, if we assume that the agents do not have complete knowledge of
the functional forms and parameters, then the agents cannot use the auxiliary variable for
computing inﬂation expectations. Therefore, we express the AS equation with long-horizon
forecasts without introducing an auxiliary variable.
2.2.1 PLM and ALM: the contemporaneous and the forecast-based rules
Under the contemporaneous rule or the forecast-based rule, PLM is given as
Xt = At + Dtrnt , (5)
where A and D are 2 by 1 vectors of PLM coeﬃcients. It follows that
∞∑
j=2
φj−11 X
e
t+j = (1− φ1)−1φ1At + (1− φ1ρr)−1φ1ρ2rDtrnt . (6)
The structural equations can be reformulated as
QXt = WXet+1 + Nit + Ur
n
t + M
∞∑
j=2
φj−11 X
e
t+j , (7)
where
Q =
[
1 0
−κ 1
]
,W =
[
1 σ
0 b1
]
, N =
[
−σ
0
]
,
U =
[
σ
0
]
,M =
[
0 0
0 b2
]
.
By inserting (5) and (6) into (7), we can obtain the actual law of motion (ALM):
Xt = (Q−NFc)−1{[W + NFf + (1− φ1)−1φ1M ]At
+[(W + NFf + (1− φ1ρr)−1φ1ρrM)ρrDt + U ]rnt }. (8)
The T-maps from the PLM to the ALM are then given as
T (At) = (Q−NFc)−1[W + NFf + (1− φ1)−1φ1M ]At (9)
T (Dt) = (Q−NFc)−1[(W + NFf + (1− φ1ρr)−1φ1ρrM)ρrDt + U ]. (10)
6See Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009) and Sbordone (2007) for details.
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Here, let DTZ(Z¯) be the Jacobian matrix of the T-map evaluated at the corresponding RE
value Z¯:
DTZ(Z¯) =
∂vec(T (Z))
∂vec(Z)′
∣∣∣∣
Z=Z¯
.
The E-stability of the REE can be attained if and only if all of the eigenvalues of DTA(A¯)
and DTD(D¯) have real parts less than one.
2.2.2 PLM and ALM: the lagged-data rule
Under the rule based on lagged data, it is implicitly assumed that the central bank and
the private agents do not have current economic data. McCallum (1999) argues that
policymakers are practically unable to obtain the data on contemporaneous macroeconomic
variables, such as inﬂation and output, in making their policy decisions. In this situation
it is natural to assume that the private agents also do not have information about current
economic data.7 Therefore, we express the PLM under the lagged-data rule as follows:
Xt = At−1 + Ct−1Xt−1 + Dt−1rnt−1, (11)
where expectations formed at time t are based on information about t− 1-dated variables.
C denotes the 2 by 2 matrix of PLM coeﬃcients. It follows that
Xet+1 = (I + Ct−1)At−1 + C
2
t−1Xt−1 + (Ct−1 + ρrI)Dt−1r
n
t−1
Xet+2 = (I + Ct−1 + C
2
t−1)At−1 + C
3
t−1Xt−1 + [Ct−1(Ct−1 + ρrI) + ρ
2
rI]Dt−1r
n
t−1
Xet+3 = (I + Ct−1 + C
2
t−1 + C
3
t−1)At−1 + C
4
t−1Xt−1
+[C2t−1(Ct−1 + ρrI) + ρ
2
rCt−1 + ρ
3
rI]Dt−1r
n
t−1
...
The inﬁnite summation term in eq. (2) leads to
∞∑
j=2
φj−11 X
e
t+j = (1− φ1)−1φ1[I + Ct−1 + (I − φ1Ct−1)−1C2t−1]At−1
+(I − φ1Ct−1)−1φ1C3t−1Xt−1
+(I − φ1Ct−1)−1φ1[Ct−1(Ct−1 + ρrI) + (1− φ1ρr)−1ρ2I]Dt−1rnt−1
= A˜t−1 + C˜t−1Xt−1 + D˜t−1rnt−1.
The ALM can then be written as
Xt = Q−1{W (I + Ct−1)At−1 + MA˜t−1 + (WC2t−1 + MC˜t−1 + NFl)Xt−1
+[W (Ct−1 + ρrI)Dt−1 + ρrU + MD˜t−1]rnt−1 + Uεt}. (12)
7Bullard and Mitra (2002) also assume this type of informational symmetry. If we instead assume that
only private agents can use the contemporaneous data, the E-stability region coincides with the determinacy
region. However, we consider this assumption practically implausible.
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The T-maps from the PLM to the ALM are then given as
T (At−1) = Q−1[W (I + Ct−1)At−1 + MA˜t−1], (13)
T (Ct−1) = Q−1(WC2t−1 + MC˜t−1 + NFl), (14)
T (Dt−1) = Q−1[W (Ct−1 + ρrI)Dt−1 + ρrU + MD˜t−1]. (15)
The E-stability conditions are that all of the eigenvalues of DTA(A¯, C¯), DTC(C¯) and
DTD(C¯, D¯) have real parts less than one.
3 The E-stability conditions under non-zero trend inflation
The combinations of the Taylor rule coeﬃcients, Fiπ and Fiy, i = c, f, l, that ensure E-
stability and determinacy of the REE are presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3. In all ﬁgures,
the upper-right panel corresponds to the case of zero trend inﬂation, which is equivalent to
the situation analyzed by Bullard and Mitra (2002). The other panels show the E-stable
and determinate regions under non-zero trend inﬂation. Although the determinate regions
(except for the case of negative trend inﬂation) are essentially the same as those presented
by Ascari and Ropele (2009), the E-stable regions are novel contribution of our study.
Our main ﬁnding is that under all speciﬁcations of the rule, higher trend inﬂation
makes REE more likely to be E-unstable: the E-stable region always shrinks as the rate of
trend inﬂation increases. This is in contrast to the case of REE determinacy since higher
trend inﬂation does not necessarily make REE more likely to be indeterminate. Under the
contemporaneous rule the E-stable region corresponds exactly to the determinate region,
while the E-stable region is broader than the determinate region under the forecast-based
rule. In the cases of these two rules, both the determinate region and E-stable region shrink
as the rate of trend inﬂation increases. However, under the lagged-data rule, things are
diﬀerent. In this case, there exists a region in which REE is determinate but E-unstable,
as shown by Bullard and Mitra (2002). In Figure 3, we ﬁnd that this region is broader for
higher trend inﬂation. When the level of trend inﬂation is high, the central bank can easily
achieve the determinacy of REE by responding strongly to the output gap, as is reported
by Ascari and Ropele (2009). However, our results show that this kind of policy action
fails to make the REE E-stable. Therefore, the REE under the lagged-data rule is more
likely to be E-unstable even if it is determinate when trend inﬂation is high.
This uniformity in the negative relation between the level of trend inﬂation and the
likelihood of E-stability implies that the concept of E-stability might be more suitable than
REE determinacy as a source of the Great Moderation since the early 1980s. Although
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) argue that a decline in trend inﬂation ensured deter-
minacy and became a source of the Great Moderation, our result suggests that such an
argument is sensitive to the nature of data introduced in the Taylor rule. When the cen-
tral bank could only make use of lagged data, it is E-stability but not REE determinacy
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that would explain the reduction of macroeconomic volatility following a decline in trend
inﬂation.
Next, let us focus on the case of negative trend inﬂation. Under all versions of Taylor
rules, the determinate and E-stable region is broader when trend inﬂation is negative
rather than positive. Therefore, the REE is less likely to be indeterminate or E-unstable
in a deﬂationary environment. This result has an important policy implication for low
inﬂation countries. If trend inﬂation is very low, the degree of freedom for the central bank
to control the nominal interest rate is inevitably small due to the presence of the zero lower
bound (ZLB). Fortunately, our result indicates that the REE is more likely to be E-stable
and determinate for lower trend inﬂation, even when the coeﬃcients of the Taylor rule are
small. As a result, the necessity of cutting interest rates against downward shocks will to
some extent be removed. This will mitigate the fear of ZLB that the central banks have in
an era of very low inﬂation.
Our analysis also shows that the availability of current economic data for the central
bank is especially important in a low inﬂation environment because, when trend inﬂation is
very low, the E-stable region is much broader under the contemporaneous rule than under
the lagged-data rule. However, in a high inﬂation environment, the E-stable regions are
similarly narrow under all versions of Taylor rules. This implies that the central bank’s
usage of current economic data does not help much to ensure the E-stability of REE. In
this sense, higher trend inﬂation is very likely to be associated with higher macroeconomic
volatility.
4 Concluding remarks
Our analysis has shown that higher trend inﬂation tends to make REE E-unstable under
various speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule. This result holds true regardless of the nature of
the data employed in the Taylor rule. Although the availability of current economic data
for the central bank helps to guarantee the expectational stability of REE in a low inﬂation
environment, this is not necessarily the case in a high inﬂation environment.
Our results provide a plausible explanation about why macroeconomic variables tend to
be quite volatile in a high inﬂation environment. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) argue
that the US economy was quite volatile in the 1970s, because high trend inﬂation caused
the indeterminacy of REE. Although this is an intriguing explanation, their argument is
sensitive to the data employed by the Fed because in the case of the lagged-data rule,
the determinacy region is quite broad even in a high inﬂation environment. In contrast,
higher trend inﬂation always narrows the E-stable region under all versions of the Taylor
rule. Therefore, the positive relationship between the level of trend inﬂation and macroe-
conomic volatility is better explained by introducing the concept of E-stability rather than
determinacy.
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Finally, our main results also have an important implication for the recent dispute on
whether the level of inﬂation targets should be set well above zero. Based on the recent
experience of the global ﬁnancial crisis, Blanchard et al. (2010) raised the issue whether
the central bank should aim for a higher inﬂation target, such as 4%, in normal times in
order to avoid ZLB. Our results may provide a negative answer to this question. A rise in
the level of trend inﬂation will change the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms in a way that a
violation of the E-stability condition becomes more likely. To investigate this issue more
formally, however, the inﬂuence of ZLB should be explicitly taken into account. This issue
should be left for future research.
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Figure 1: The E-stability and determinacy regions under the contemporaneous rule
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Figure 2: The E-stability and determinacy regions under the forecast-based rule
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Figure 3: The E-stability and determinacy regions under the lagged-data rule
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